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THE AFTERMATH OF THE AIRPLANE
ACCIDENT: RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES ACCOMPANIED
BY PHYSICAL INJURIES UNDER THE WARSAW

CONVENTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air,1 popularly known as the Warsaw
Convention, took place when the commercial aviation industry was at its
infant state of development.! The United States became a signatory to
the Convention in 1934.? "The essential purpose of the Convention was
to provide the world's fledging airline industry with a 'legal basis' for its
operation., 4 The purpose of the Convention is also evident through a
reading of the preamble that provided for regulation "in a uniform
manner the conditions of international transportation by air in respect
of the... liability of the carrier.0 Seventy years after the Convention
went into effect6 commercial aviation is no longer an infant industry.
American passengers rely on international transportation by air to
conduct their business and to take vacations. In 1929, "the only
international air flight from the United States was between Key West,
Florida, and Havana, Cuba."7 Today it is possible to reach any
destination in the world.
Because the commercial aviation industry has significantly
developed and gained unparalleled strength, the Warsaw Convention
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934) [hereinafter the

Warsaw Convention].
2. See Dale M. Eaton, Note, Recovery for Purely EmotionalDistress Under the Warsaw
Convention: Narrow Construction of Lesion Corporellein Eastern Airlines,Inc v. Floyd, 1993
WIS. L. REV. 563, 568 (quoting Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United
States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497,498 (1967)).
3. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 563.
4. James K. Noble, III, Note, Up in the Air Without a Ticket: Interpretationand Revision
of the Warsaw Convention, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.332,335 (1982-83).

5. The Warsaw Convention, supranote 1, 49 Stat. at 3014:
6. See The Warsaw Convention, supra note 1.
7. David Cohen, Montreal Protocob The Most Recent Attempt to Modify the Warsaw
Convention, 8 J. AIR L. & COM. 146,150 (1983).
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should no longer be viewed as a protective measure that limits the
liability of airlines for injuries suffered by passengers during the course
of international transportation.8 Instead, the Warsaw Convention
should be viewed as a tool that allows international passengers recovery
for the damages suffered during an air accident. The majority of courts
in the United States fail to see the Convention in such a light.9
0 the Supreme Court of the United
In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,"
States decided that air carriers cannot be liable for purely psychological
injuries under the Warsaw Convention." The court of last resort on
questions of treaty interpretation applied a narrow construction of the
French term lesion corporelle" and ignored the plea for a broad
construction of the Warsaw Convention.13 The ramifications of Floyd
are clear. For example, a passenger on an international flight who is
told to prepare for an emergency landing and suffers from apprehension
of near death, cannot recover for the emotional injuries, if the plane
does not crash and no physical damages are suffered. The Supreme
Court, however, "express[ed] no view as to whether plaintiffs can
recover for mental problems accompanied by physical injuries."14
The brethren of the Floyd decision continue to endorse the narrow
interpretation of the Convention without paying much attention to the
plain meaning of the text. On the issue left unanswered by the Supreme
8. The courts have consistently held that the primary objective and the dominant
purpose of the Convention was to limit the liability of air carriers for injuries arising out of
accidents that take place during the course of international travel. See, e.g., Husserl v. Swiss
Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973);
Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds,550 F. 2d 152 (3rd Cir. 1977); Domangue v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 722 F. 2d 256 (5th Cir.
1984); see also, Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, Limitation of Liability of Air CarrierFor
PersonalInjury or Death, 91 A.L.R. FED. 547 (1999).
9. See Gross, supra note 8, at 547 (providing a more complete list).
10. 499 U.S. 530 (1991). Because the Warsaw Convention is a treaty, the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to hear cases arising under it. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("The judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority").
11. Floyd,499 U.S. at 534-36.
12. From French "bodily injury." See id. at 536.
13. "Court [was] not persuaded by argument that French law permitted recovery for
mental distress when the Convention was drafted in 1929; Court [was] not persuaded by
argument that Berne Convention permitted recovery for purely emotional injuries; Court
[was] not persuaded by substitution of the phrase 'personal injury' in place of the phrase
'bodily injury' on passenger tickets and in subsequent international agreements; Court [was]
not persuaded by contrary holding of Israel Supreme Court." Eaton, supra note 2, at 583
n.133 (citations omitted).
14. Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552-53.
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Court, several district courts have held that merely claiming that
physical injuries led to psychological damages in the aftermath of an
accident occurring in the course of international transportation is
insufficient for recovery under the Warsaw Convention."5 Instead, the
Alvarez court and the Carey court adopted a similar reasoning requiring
that a passenger, who suffers psychological injuries accompanied by
physical injuries, prove a strong causal nexus between mental and
physical injuries.6 Other federal courts refuse to hold that psychological
injuries that are coupled with physical injuries, but not caused by them,
are not recoverable under the Warsaw Convention.17 Instead, these
courts hold that recovery for psychological injuries, even if unrelated to
the physical trauma, is allowed as long as there are some physical
injuries. 8
This Comment examines the conflicting decisions that address the
issue of recovery of psychological damages that are accompanied by
some physical damages under the Warsaw Convention. This Comment
argues that the plain language of the Convention does not require a
showing of the "strong causal nexus" between the physical injuries and
the psychological injuries. Instead, the Convention requires a simple
causal connection between the accident and the injuries that result
therefrom. 9 This Comment concludes that the Supreme Court must
revisit its 1991 Floyd decision to clarify the issue for the lower courts.
The modern commercial aviation industry is advanced enough to
15. See Alvarez v. American Airlines, No. 98-CIV1027, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13656, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1999); see also Carey v. United Airlines, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D.
Or. 1999).
16. See Alvarez, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13656, at *14.
17. See, e.g. In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994, 954 F.
Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1997).

18. See .
19. The official text of the treaty is French. See Jean-Paul Boulee, Note, Recovery for
Mental Injuries That Are Accompanied By Physical Injuries Under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention: The Progeny of Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 501,
505 (1995) (citing Lisa A. Fromm, Note, Eastern Airlines v. Floyd.- Airline PassengersDenied
Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention, 25 AKRON L. REV. 425, 426
(1991)). When the Senate ratified the treaty in 1934, the following official translation was
used:
The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the
accidentwhich caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
The Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17. (emphasis added).
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minimize air disasters. Yet, it is not immune from them. The horrific
crashes and "near miss" accidents have occurred with unfortunate
frequency in the past years. ° The Warsaw Convention already limits the
liability of the air carriers but should not be used by them as a shield to
avoid liability altogether. The Supreme Court must preserve the intent
of the framers who wanted to limit the liability of the air carriers. Yet,
the injured plaintiffs must have the ability to recover for their
psychological injuries accompanied by physical injuries, caused by the
air carriers' tortious conduct.
As background, Part I of this Comment analyzes the history of the
Convention, and the intent of the framers not to limit the recovery for
specific injuries. Part II examines the reasoning of the lower courts and
the conflicting interpretation of the treaty by the Supreme Court. Part
III analyzes the express language of the treaty under the traditional
canons of interpretation used by courts in other contexts. It concludes
that the language does not require a proximate causal connection
advocated by some of the lower federal courts and urges the Supreme
Court to revisit its 1991 Floyd decision and announce that plaintiffs who
suffer psychological injuries accompanied by physical injuries can
recover under the Warsaw Convention.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Treaty

In 1929, more than thirty countries participated in the drafting of the
original international treaty that had a purpose of providing protection

20. On January 30, 2000 Kenyan Flight 461 from Abidjan, Kenya to Lagos, Nigeria
crashed, killing 169. On January 31, 2000, Alaskan Airlines Flight 261 went down off the
coast of Southern California. On October 31, 1999, EgyptAir Flight 900 originated in Los
Angeles and then departed from New York's JFK International Airport at 1:19 a.m. EST.
The Boeing 767 jet, carrying 217 passengers, was destined for Cairo, Egypt, before it plunged
sharply into the Atlantic Ocean off Nantucket, Massachusetts. No one survived. See
generally ABC News Special Report on Sunday, October 31, 1999 (available at LEXIS News
Group File: Most Recent-90 days) (visited Sept. 15, 2000). There have been reported
allegations that a relief co-pilot and member of the crew, Gameel El Batouty, committed a
wrongful act that caused the plane to crash. If these allegations are substantiated with
concrete evidence, the potential plaintiffs will have a strong claim against the airline that it is
guilty of "willful misconduct." On November 16, 1999, the first wrongful death suit was filed
against EgyptAir on behalf of the estate of Ghassan Koujan, a 38-year-old resident of New
Jersey who died in the crash. See First Suit Filed Against Egyptian Air & Boeing
<http:llwww.courttv.comlnational/1999/waitingcomplaint_text-doc.htm>. (visited Sept. 15,

2000).
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to the commercial aviation industry.2' The United States did not
participate in the drafting process but ratified the treaty in 1934." The
liability of air carriers for death or any bodily injuries of passengers was
limited to $8, 3 00.' Immediately after the treaty went into effect, the
signatories became dissatisfied with the low amount of air carrier
liability.!4 The parties attempted to address this dissatisfaction by
adopting the Hague Protocol of 1955. The United States, however,
never adhered to the Hague Protocol.26
Dissatisfaction with the low liability limit culminated on November
15, 1965, when the United States notified other signatories that it was
denouncing the Warsaw Convention, and was withdrawing from it
effective May 16, 1966. To address the problem, a special meeting was
called in Montreal in February 1966. 9 The parties resolved the problem
through the Montreal Agreement, "[t]he effect of [which] was to
increase the liability limit to $75,000 per passenger for international
flights originating, stopping over, or ending in the United States."' The
agreement abolished the negligence standard and replaced it with a
strict liability policy for damages.3' The United States withdrew the
denunciation notice on May 13,1966!2
21. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 570, n.27 (indicating that the list includes the German
Reich, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Iceland, Egypt, Spain, Estonia,
Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions, India, Greece, Hungary,
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Rumania,
Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia). Id.
22. Id. at563.
23. See Gross, supra note 8, at 561 (stating that originally, there was a presumption of
air carriers' negligence. This presumption could be rebutted by showing that the air carrier
acted reasonably and had taken all proper measures to prevent an accident and subsequent
harm to the passengers).
24. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 570 (citing Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at

502).
25. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 504. The authors indicated that the
liability was increased to $16,600 per passenger. See id at 507.
26. See id. at 509-16.
27. See Gross, supra note 8, at 568.
28. See Boulee, supranote 19, at 507.

29. See id.
30. Eaton, supra note 2, at 571.
31. See id. Following the adoption of the Montreal Agreement, the courts expressed the
view that the agreement did not affect Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and added no
substantive changes to the overall purpose of the Warsaw Convention. See, e.g., MacDonald
v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971).
32. See Boulee, supra note 19, at 504 (citing Dafna Yoran, Comment, Recovery of
Emotional Damages Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention: The American Versus the
IsraeliApproach, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L 811 (1992)).
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There were additional attempts to increase the liability of airlines,
undertaken both domestically and internationally. 33 In 1992, ten
Japanese air carriers voluntarily signed an agreement and waived the
Warsaw Convention liability limits.' To implement the change, the
Japanese air carriers changed the language on conditions of carriage, a
contract between a passenger and an airline, regarding liability for
passenger's injuries in the course of international transportation?'
Other international air carriers did not immediately follow the Japanese
airlines because of fear of increased insurance costs? 6
Several local and international air carriers took action in 1996 to
adopt the International Air Transport Association ("IATA")
Intercarrier Agreement.
The agreement "requires carriers to
'voluntarily' waive the Warsaw Convention's liability cap and the
application of strict liability principles to claims as high as approximately
U.S. $135,000. ' 38 Additionally, plaintiffs can recover in excess of this
sum, if the airline fails to prove it is without fault.39 Although this effort
should be praised, the IATA Agreement is merely a contract, and as
such, it does not have the same legal effect as the Warsaw Convention, a
treaty, and, thus, a law in the United States and in the other countries
that ratified the 1929 Convention.?'
On May 9, 1997, the International Civil Aviation Organization
("ICAO") ratified a draft of a new international convention changing
the liability limits established by the Warsaw Convention." The draft
convention provides for a two tiered system: strict liability is used for
damages below $135,000, and fault-based liability is used to recover
damages in excess of $135,000.42

Although the draft convention is

similar to the IATA agreement in its purpose of lifting the limited
33. See generally Andrea L. Buff, Note, Reforming the Liability Provisions of the
Warsaw Convention:Does the IATA IntercarrierAgreement Eliminate the Need to Amend the
Convention, 20 FORDHAM INT'L LJ.1768 (1997); Matthew R. Pickelman, Comment, Draft
Conventionfor the Unification of CertainRules for InternationalCarriageBy Air: The Warsaw
Convention Revisited for the Last Time? 64 J. AIR L. & COM. 273 (1998).
34. See generally Naneen K. Baden, Comment, The Japanese Initiative on the Warsaw
Convention, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 437, 453 (1996) (describing Japanese initiative).
35. See Buff supra note 33, at 1789.
36. See id. at 1791.
37. See Pickelman, supranote 33, at 276.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See Buff, supra note 33, at 1831 n.479.
41. See id. at 1830.
42. See Pickelman, supranote 33, at 278.
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liability, there are two important differences. 43

First, the draft

convention has the effect of law, not merely a contract. 4 "In addition,
certain provisions of the Draft Convention, such as an 'Updating
Clause,' which provides for periodic adjustments of the liability
limitations, go far beyond that endeavored by the IATA."45
B. The Warsaw Convention and the Supreme Court
The Warsaw Convention has been interpreted by a great number of
federal courts. 46 Since 1985, the Supreme Court has battled with the
language of the Warsaw Convention six times, each time adding a new
layer of interpretation.47 It is evident that in each of its decisions, the
Supreme Court was trying to preserve the dual purpose of the Warsaw
Convention, as it was envisioned by the original drafters.'
At least in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,49 however, the Supreme
Court incorrectly interpreted the Convention and did not do justice to
either the individual plaintiffs or to the spirit of the Convention.
Generally, the Supreme Court has held that the Warsaw Convention
is a self-executing treaty." This means that no domestic legislation is
necessary to give the Treaty the force of law in the United States.51
Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided in Air France v. Saks52 that
the interpretation of the Warsaw Convention was governed by the
43. See id.
44. See id
45. Id
46. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons And Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 953, 981 n.155 (1994). "Judging by the number of interpretative cases involving the
Warsaw Convention, it is probably the most litigated treaty in U.S. courts." Id
47. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999); Zicherman v. Korean
Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991); Air
France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989);
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
48. The writers of the Convention wanted to achieve two goals. First, was to achieve a
certain degree of uniformity in the industry. Second, was to limit the liability of international
air carriers. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supranote 2, at 497.
49. 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
50. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984) (holding
that the repeal of a federal statute that set the price of gold in the United States did not make
the gold-based cargo liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention unenforceable).
51. Treaties have the same force as statutes and, therefore, are the law of the land. The
United States Constitution empowers the federal courts with the jurisdiction to hear
"Cases... arising under.., the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority .... " U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See Bederman, supra note 46,
at 954.
52. 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
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official French text."
The Saks decision is noteworthy because the Court interpreted the
word "accident" and held that it means "an unexpected or unusual
event or happening that is external to the passenger."'
In Saks, the
Court emphasized the importance of the fact that the Convention
imposed liability for injuries caused by an "accident." 55 Second, the
Court found it significant that "the text of Article 17 referred to an
accident, which caused (French 'qui a caus6') the passenger's
injury, and
56
injury.
passenger's
the
was
which
accident
not to an
In 1989, the Supreme Court held that the commercial airline that
engages in international transportation does not lose the cap on liability
provided by the Warsaw Convention, even if the notice to the
passengers is in smaller type than allowed by the Montreal Agreement.'
The Montreal accord required those airlines that executed it to provide
passengers with the notice, in at least a 10-point font, that liability for
injuries suffered in the course of international air transportation is
limited.The passengers in Chan, all of whom were killed when the aircraft
was destroyed while in the air, received tickets with a notice appearing
on them in an 8-point font. 59 The Court interpreted the language of the
Convention that lifts limited liability if the air carrier "accepts a
passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered."60
According to the Court, this language means that the limited liability
shield is available so long as there is no shortcoming that is so extensive
that the document issued to the passenger cannot be described as a

53. See id. at 397-99. The official French text of Article 17 reads: "Le transporteur est
responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort, de blessure ou de toute autre 16sion
corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque l'accident qui a causd le dommage s'est produit a
bord de I'a6ronef ou au cours de toutes opdrations d'embarquement et de ddbarquement."
Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 at 535. For the official English translation, see supranote 19.
54. 470 U.S. at 405. Specifically, the Court stated: "This definition should be flexibly
applied after assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger's injuries ....In
cases where there is contradictory evidence, it is for the trier of fact to decide whether an
.accident" as here defined caused the passenger's injury...." Id.

55. See id. at 398-99.
56. John F. Wagner Jr., Annotation, Supreme Court's Construction and Application of
Warsaw Convention (49 Stat 3000 et seq.), Pertainingto InternationalAir Transportation,113
L. Ed. 806, § 7 (1997).
57. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 129 (1989).
58. See generally Agreement CAB 18900,31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
59. See Chan, 490 U.S. at 124.
60. The Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3(2).
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61

In Floyd,6" Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court,
concluded that "an air carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17
when an accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical
injury, or physical manifestation of injury." '" The Court expressed no
opinion on whether psychological damages that are accompanied by
physical damages are recoverable," or whether the Warsaw Convention
is the only cause of action available to plaintiffs who suffered injuries
during the course of international air transportation.'
In Floyd, the passengers were on a flight between Miami and the
Bahamas.6 The plane experienced engine failures and began to descend
with an abnormal speed towards the Atlantic Ocean. 67 The pilots
announced that the "plane would be ditched.""6 Fortunately, the crew
restarted the engine, and the plane was landed safely at Miami Airport.
Passengers on this Eastern Airlines flight sued the air carrier for
emotional damages caused by the loss of engine power during the
flight." Because loss of engine power during a flight constituted an
accident, Article 17 applied. The plaintiffs were not able to recover,
however, because they did not allege that they suffered any physical
damages as a result of the air accident.7

On January 12, 1999, the Supreme Court decided the question left
open by the Floyd decision: whether the Warsaw Convention is the only
cause of action available to a plaintiff injured in the course of
international air transportation.'
Before Tsui Yuan Tseng, a passenger, boarded an El Al flight from
New York to Tel Aviv, El Al subjected her to an intrusive security
search. She sued El Al in state court in New York for assault and false
61. See Gross, supra note 8, at 630-31.
62. 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
63. Id at 552.

64. See id,
at 552-53.
65. See id.at 553.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See id, at 533.
Id.
at 533.
Id
See id.
See id.
See id.
at 553.
See El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999); see also Loryn B. Zerner,

Note, Tseng v. El Al IsraelAirlines and Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention: A Cloud Left
Uncharted,14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1245,1246 (1999).
73. See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 160. Ms. Tseng was told "to take off her jacket, sweater, shoes,
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imprisonment and claimed the search made her extremely sick and
upset.74 The suit was removed to federal court, and then dismissed on
the basis that the plaintiff failed to establish an injury recognized under
the Warsaw Convention. 5 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, holding that a plaintiff who did not qualify for relief under the
Convention could seek relief under local law for an injury sustained in
the course of international air travel."
In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court
reversed the Second Circuit and decided that the Warsaw Convention
"precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal injury
damages under local law when . . . the claim does not satisfy the

conditions for liability" established by that treaty.7 Recourse to local
law, the Court concluded, would undermine the uniform regulation of
international air carrier liability under the Convention. 8
The Supreme Court decisions made the Warsaw Convention alien
and incomprehensible. The Court now looked at the language of
articles 17, 18, 24 and 25. In finding almost every substantive provision
of the treaty ambiguous, the Court created an unpredictable
and belt, and to loosen and lower her blue jeans to just below her hip. The woman proceeded
to search her, first by feeling her body by hand outside her clothes from head to toe, and then
with an electronic security wand." Tseng v. El Al Airlines, Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 155, 157
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), rev'd in part,122 F.3d 99 (2d. Cir. 1997), rev'd,525 U.S. 155 (1999).
74. See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 164.
75. See id. Tseng alleged psychic or psychosomatic injuries, but no "bodily injury," as
that term is used in the Warsaw Convention. See id. Tseng argued that Article 24 of the
Warsaw Convention should be construed to allow a plaintiff who does not satisfy the liability
requirements of Article 17 to pursue the claim under state tort law. The airline, on the other
hand, argued that the language of Article 24 is unambiguous in that it creates an exclusive
cause of action. See id. Article 24, in its English version, provides:
In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for damages, however founded,
can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention.
In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall
also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who have
the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.
The Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 24,49 Stat. at 3006; 137 L.N.T.S. at 26-27.
76. See Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d at 99 (2d Cir. 1997).
77. Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999). The Supreme Court,
just like the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, did not address the issue of whether the alleged
injuries are recoverable under the Warsaw Convention. See id.The plaintiff was alleging that
the Floyd requirement of "bodily injury" was satisfied because as a result of the search she
developed headaches, nervousness and sleeplessness, all physical manifestations of
psychological injury. See Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 155, 157 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), rev'd in part,affd in part,Tseng, 122 F. 3d 99 (2d Cir. 1998), revd, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
7& See Tseng, 525 U.S at 171.
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inconclusive environment for lower courts to engage in a frustrating and
sometimes dangerous exercise of treaty interpretation.
Conflicting decisions of lower courts addressing the issue of recovery
for psychological injuries accompanied by physical injuries.
The Floyd decision left the question of whether emotional damages
are recoverable if physical damages exist unanswered.79
C. Summary of Lower FederalCourtDecisions
1. Decisions where recovery was denied.
Lower federal courts that deny recovery for emotional distress, if the
distress is not caused by physical injuries, derive their reasoning from
Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.S'
In Jack, Trans World Airlines Flight 843 departed from New York's
JFK bound for San Francisco on July 30, 1992.1 The flight experienced
"an aborted takeoff, crash and fire. "2 The fire completely destroyed the
plane." Fortunately, all passengers survived, although many suffered
physical injuries.8 Plaintiffs filed personal injury suits in state court, but
the defendant, TWA, removed three of the filed actions to a federal
court because the plaintiffs held tickets for international flights.'
After making several evidentiary rulings, the court attempted to
interpret Article 17 of the Convention and the meaning of the Floyd
decision.' The court did not concentrate on the express language of the
Convention.' It acknowledged, however, that "one construction is that
the recoverable damages need not be caused by the bodily injury, and
The court then
may instead be those caused by the accident."' '
presented several approaches to this problem:

79. See E. Airlines Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
80. 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994).

81. See id. at 657.
82 ILd.
83. See id.

84. See id.
85. See id
at 665.
86. See id.
87. See id. The court said it is unclear under Article 17 whether the recoverable
damages are those caused by the bodily injury or by the accident itself. See id. "Article 17
provides that the carrier is liable for 'damage sustained in the event of... bodily injury.' It
does not state that the damages must be caused by the bodily injury. Causation is not implied
in the French phrase 'dommage survenu en cas.' " Id.
88. Id.
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There are four possible approaches regarding emotional distress
in a Warsaw Convention case: (1) no recovery allowed for
emotional distress; (2) recovery allowed for all distress, as long as
a bodily injury occurs; (3) emotional distress allowed as damages
for bodily injury, but distress may include distress about the
accident; and (4) only emotional distress flowing from the bodily
injury is recoverable.'
The court refused to adopt the first approach because it was too
restrictive of passengers' rights,90 even though it was consistent with the
narrow construction of Article 17 by the Floyd Court.91 Then, the court
refused to adopt a second approach that favored plaintiffs' position and
advocated a broad construction of Article 17.9 The court declined to
consider an expert's opinion regarding the "intrinsic physical effects" of
emotional distress because it "would eviscerate Floyd."9
Judge Caulfield, the author of the Jack opinion, stated that this
approach is supported by the language of the Convention, by the "Floyd
court's careful avoidance of any mention of a need for a causal
connection between the bodily injury and the damages recoverable
under the Warsaw Convention," and by a general approach in tort cases,
where the showing of a physical injury is a threshold requirement to
recovery for emotional distress.' This approach, however, could not be
adopted because it treats emotional distress as a separate cause of
action.95 The court summarily rejected this approach without providing
adequate reasoning and without paying attention to the express
language of the Convention. 96 The third approach was rejected as a
derivative of the second one.'
Finally, the court analyzed the fourth approach and concluded that
"damages are permitted for emotional distress only to the extent the

89. Id.

90. See id.
91. See E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 520, 544-45 (1991).
92. See Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 665.
93. Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1191 (N.D. 1999) (citing Jack v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654,664 (N.D. Cal. 1994)).
94. Jack 854 F. Supp. at 666.
95. The Supreme Court has held that the Warsaw Convention creates a cause of action.
See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
96. See Jack,854 F. Supp. at 666.

97. See id. at 667.
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emotional distress is caused by the bodily injury."9' The court again did
not analyze the language of the Convention; rather, it reasoned that the
fourth approach prevents inequities among the passengers, and for this
reason it should be adopted. 9 Under this approach, a plaintiff cannot
recover for the distress about the accident itself or for the distress
associated with fear of a near crash.1" It is doubtful that the court, so
concerned with equities and to some extent with passengers' rights, has
achieved an equitable result.
In Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit refused to allow recovery to a passenger
whose emotional distress manifested in physical damages, following the
approach adopted by the Jack court.9
In this case Caroline Terrafranca and her family (husband and son)
were passengers on an international flight to London. 3 The captain
learned of a bomb threat and, adhering to the airline's safety protocol,
informed the passengers of the threat.'3 Ms. Terrafranca became very
concerned and frightened for the safety of her son." The plane safely
landed at Heathrow, and none of the passengers suffered any physical
injuries.93 Ms. Terrafranca, however, was afraid to fly back, and had to
stay in London for six weeks." She was diagnosed with a post-traumatic
stress disorder complicated by anorexia."
The district court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a
physical injury and denied recovery.' °9 The Court of Appeals affirmed,
citing Floyd, and refused to interpret the decision of the Supreme Court
as permitting recovery for psychological injuries so long as they are

98. hid at 667.
99. See id. at 668.
100. See id. ("Plaintiffs with physical manifestations may recover damages for the
manifestations and any distress flowing from manifestations, but may not recover damages for
the emotional distress that led to the manifestations. In both cases the emotional distress
recoverable is limited to the distress about the physical impact or manifestation, i.e., the
bodily injury"). Id101. 151 F.3d 108 (3rd Cir. 1998).
102. See i.
103. See id. at 109.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See i.
See id.
See id. at 109.
See id.
See i.
See .
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manifested by a physical injury.11
In, Alvarez v. American Airlines,"' one of the most recent
affirmations of the Jack reasoning, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York held that the defendant American
Airlines was not liable because the emotional injuries were "not
112
proximately caused by physical injuries suffered during the accident.
On February 20, 1996, Francisco Alvarez traveled from New York to
Santo Domingo on American Airlines Flight 587.113 Shortly after the
plane left the gate, it stopped.' Two minutes later "'a strong gas smell'
suffused the passenger cabin, and the plane filled rapidly with smoke." 15
After the flight attendant yelled "get out," Mr. Alvarez and other
passengers pushed for the exits.1 During the subsequent evacuation
from the burning plane, Mr. Alvarez was injured on an emergency
slide. 117 One month after the accident, Mr. Alvarez began to experience
nightmares and anxiety attacks.1
He was diagnosed with a post9
traumatic stress disorder.
The court first addressed the issue of Mr. Alvarez's physical injuries
and concluded that they are recoverable under Article 17.2 The court
stated that recovery is warranted because the requirement of
"proximate causation" is satisfied.2 Proximate cause, however, is not a
requirement under Article 17. This remark set the tone for the rest of
the opinion, and it was not surprising to see the court imposing a
requirement of proximate causation on the recovery of psychological
injuries. "

110. See id. at 110-11. ("We ... hold that Ms. Terrafranca must demonstrate direct,
concrete, bodily injury as opposed to mere manifestation of fear or anxiety"). l at 111.
111. No. 98-Civ.1027, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13656, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7,1999).
112. Id. at *17.
113. See id&at *2.
114. See 1d.
115. Id.
116. Id at* 2.
117. See itL
118. See id. at *3 ("Although his panic attacks occur[red] at various times, they [were]
most likely to occur when [Mr.] Alvarez [was] overheated, or [was] in an enclosed space, as he
was just before and during the evacuation"). Idr at *3-4.
119. See id at *4.
120. See id. at *7.
121. See id. at * 7.
122 See id. at *8-9 ("Although plaintiffs claim that Alvarez has suffered both physical
and psychological injuries, they do not allege that there is any substantial causal connection
between the two types of injury").
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The court rejected Mr. Alvarez's claim for psychological injuries for
three reasons." The first reason is the preservation of the substantive
decision in Floyd.124 The second reason is consistency of the Second
Circuit Article 17 jurisprudence."s The third and final reason is
protection against "illogical results.""5 In reaching its decision, the court
did not attempt to interpret the language of Article 17. If it had, it
would become clear that the requirement of "proximate cause," a
creature of American tort law, does not appear in the language of the
Article.
The reasoning of the Alvarez court has received support from the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon. Not finding any
precedent in the Ninth Circuit, this district court recently held that the
Warsaw Convention did not allow recovery for a plaintiff's claim that
the intentional verbal insults by the flight attendant caused the plaintiff
severe emotional distress, physically manifested by "nausea, cramps,
perspiration, nervousness, tension, and sleeplessness.""
The plaintiff and his three daughters traveled from Costa Rica to
Portland in March of 1998.' On the return flight from Costa Rica the
flight attendant refused to allow the plaintiff to help his daughters cope
with developed ear aches because that would have involved switching
the plaintiff's seats in first class with his seats in coach.' 9 The attendant
cited some Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") regulation that
prohibited switching seats and told the plaintiff that "an FAA
representative was on board who could arrest plaintiff because
plaintiff's children were leaving coach and going into the first class
cabin."'" During a "heated exchange" the plaintiff was verbally insulted
and publicly humiliated. 3 ' He sued, alleging that the Warsaw
Convention does not bar recovery for psychological injuries manifested
by physical injuries."
123. See idat *10-11.
124. See id at *10.
125. See id.at *11.
126. IM. at *13. The court, quoting from the Jack opinion, expressed its fear that
"passengers may be treated differently from one another on the basis of an arbitrary and

insignificant difference in their [physical] experience." I&. at *14 (citing Jack v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 664,668 (N.D. Cal. 1994)).
127. Carey v. United Airlines, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d. 1165 (D. Or. 1999).
128. See id. at 1167.

129. See id. at 1167-68.
130. Id. at 1168.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 1168-69.
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In ruling for the airline, the district court first relied on Tseng
because the plaintiff here, similar to the plaintiff in Tseng, alleged that
physical manifestation of psychological injuries caused by an accident
were recoverable."' The district court stated that because the Supreme
Court in Tseng did not address the issue of the Floyd requirement under
the presented circumstances, "[t]he precedential value of the Court's
determination that the plaintiff alleged no bodily injury... is somewhat
questionable."1 34 The court immediately concluded, however, that "[the
Tseng decision] is an indication that the Supreme Court would likely not
find injuries purely descended from emotional distress to be
compensable under the Convention. ' 135 The court acknowledged the
Roselawn" decision and its interpretation of the language of Article 17,
but questioned the continued validity of Roselawn in light of Tseng.M
2. Decisions where recovery was allowed.
The following decisions have either permitted recovery for
psychological injuries provided only that there are some physical
injuries or alluded to the fact that such recovery is permitted under
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
In Hunt v. TACA International Airlines, Inc.,'38 the court denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of recovery of
mental distress damages. 9
Richard Hunt was a passenger on a TACA flight that originated in
Belize City and was bound for New Orleans."4 During the course of the
flight the plane lost one of its engines and embarked on a "frightening,
erratic and uncontrolled path onto the Merida [Mexico] airport."1 " The
airplane landed safely. 2 Ten months after the accident Mr. Hunt died
from a brain condition known as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. 43
133. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
134. Carey,77 F. Supp. 2d at 1173.
135. Id.

136. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
137. See Carey, 77 F.Supp. 2d at 1173.
138. No. 96-3064,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18370, *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 17, 1997).
139. See id at *1.
140. See id. at *2.
141. Id. This was not the first time Mr. Hunt experienced an air accident. In 1993 he
was a passenger on a TACA flight that crashed in Guatemala City. After surviving that
ordeal, Mr. Hunt developed a post-traumatic stress syndrome and was attended to by a
psychiatrist. See id.
142. See id.

143. See id. A disease is described as "a gradually progressive infection of the brain
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The plaintiff alleged that the 1996 accident caused a traumatic brain
injury that facilitated the development of the Creuzfeldt-Jakob
disease.'" The defendant filed a motion to dismiss. 4s In opposing the
motion, the plaintiff offered several medical records that, the plaintiff
argued, indicated a physical injury the plaintiff suffered while on the
plane.1"
In denying the motion, the court stressed that the plaintiff presented
issues of material fact concerning whether the mental injuries relate to
the physical manifestation of injuries." Unlike the Alvarez court, the
Hunt court talked only about the relation between the physical injury or
its manifestation and the psychological injuries." The Hunt court did
not discuss the "requirement" of proximate cause and did not attempt to
harmonize the Floyd decision.149 Rather, it accepted the plaintiff's
argument that psychological damages can be recovered if a Floyd
requirement of presence of physical damages is satisfied.
In another case, Weaver v. Delta Airlines,"'o the district court denied
the defendant Delta's motion for summary judgment, and held that the
Warsaw Convention allows recovery for the type of injury suffered by
the passengers in Jack or Alvarez.51
Kathy Weaver was a passenger on a Delta flight from London to
Billings on November 7, 1996. 2 Mechanical problems en route forced
the emergency landing of the plane. Weaver alleged that during the
caused by an infectious protein particle called a prion. Symptoms include a rapid progression
of dementia, confusion and unsteadiness. More than 99% of cases occur in people over 35

years

of

age."

See

<http://www.health.sa.gov.au/pehs/Youve-got-what/specific

conditions/creutzfeldt-jakob.htm.> (visited Sept. 15, 2000) (on file with the Marquette Law

Review).
144. See Hunt,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18370, at * 3.
145. See id. at *4.
146. See id.

147. See id. at *9. The plaintiff argued that the injuries suffered during the 1996 accident
aggravated a post-traumatic stress disorder developed after the 1993 accident and additionally
caused the development of the fatal disease. See a at *8.

148. See id. at *9.
149. See idt Judge Thomas G. Porteous, Jr. only cites the relevant passage from the
Floyd decision where the Supreme Court "express[ed] no view as to whether passengers can

recover for mental injuries that are accompanied by physical injuries." Eastern Airlines v.
Floyd, 499 U.S. 530,552 (1991).
150. 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Mo. 1999).

151. See id. "The legal question in this case is simply whether the Warsaw Convention
allows recovery for this particular kind of bodily injury, i.e., a brain injury, even with slight

physical effects. The answer must be yes." I&d at 1192.
152. See id. at 1190.
153. See id.
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landing she experienced terror and "felt physical manifestations of that
terror."'m' A short time after the accident Weaver was diagnosed and
received treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder.'
Delta asserted a defense under Floyd, arguing Weaver's injuries
were psychotic, and in the absence of physical injuries were not
recoverable. 6 The court rejected the defendant's position, stating that
Weaver suffered a bodily injury (Floyd's requirement) for which the
Warsaw Convention provides compensation.:' To this court the central
factor of the query was medical, not legal. The court accepted the
testimony that "extreme stress causes actual physical brain damage, i.e.,
physical destruction or atrophy of portions of the hippocampus of the
brain."
With this decision, the court was not afraid to "eviscerate Floyd,"
and was not afraid, unlike the Jack and Alvarez courts, to open the
floodgates of litigation." 9 The Weaver court went further and rejected
the Jack approach that injuries that arise from fear about the flight are
not recoverable.lW Although this court did not base its decision in the
language of the treaty, it did not do injustice to the latter by imposing a
fictional requirement of "proximate cause.161
Finally, in In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on
October 31, 1994," the court, after careful analysis of the treaty
language and the Floyd decision, concluded that psychological damages
that are accompanied by physical damages are recoverable under
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.' 6'
This litigation stemmed from a 1994 crash of American Eagle Flight
4184 in which 68 people died." Several passengers used Flight 4184 in a
course of international transportation, thus requiring the analysis of

154. Id.

155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 1191.
158. 1l
159. See id. at 1192. The Jack court, on the other hand, refused to hear the medical
testimony that a post-traumatic stress disorder is characterized with physical effects. See Jack
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654,664 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
160. See Weaver, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
161. See Alvarez v. Am. Airlines, No. 98-Civ. 1027, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13656, at *89.
162. 954 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill.
1997) [hereinafter Roselawn].
163. See id. at 176.
164. See id.
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their injuries under the Warsaw Convention. 16 The court promptly
noted that the case deals with the interpretation of the Convention."
After reviewing the Saks decision, the court repeated the oft-quoted
language that Article 17 "establishes liability only for injuries caused by
an accident."1 67 Then, the court discussed the Floyd decision and
correctly observed:
[T]he Court in Floyd did not hold that there could never be any
recovery for purely psychic injuries under Article 17, although
the holding of Floyd is often characterized this way. Instead, the
Court employed careful language to hold that "physical injury"
was a precondition to liability. Nothing in Floyd states that once
that precondition is met, and physical injury 1or death is present,
damages for mental distress are not available.
The Roselawn court first distinguished this case from Floyd on the
ground that in the latter case, the plaintiff did not allege any physical
damages.6 The court could not distinguish the case at bar from the
Jack case and similar ones that followed the reasoning of Jack.170
Although the court was "not unmoved by the reasoning" of the Jack
court, it declined to follow it for one very important reason-"the
[plain] commands of Article 17.""7 With respect to the concern that the
view adopted would create inequities, the court responded that it is
equally likely that the Floyd and the Jack decisions result in greater
inequities." More important, however, is the fact that the court refused
to rewrite Article 17 and based its decision on the express language of
the Treaty.73

165. See id. The defendants in this case argued that the plaintiffs could recover for preimpact fear because the latter were psychic injuries, and Floyd prevented recovery for such
injuries. See id. The plaintiffs asserted that these psychic injuries are accompanied by
physical injuries (death), and in such a case the Warsaw Convention permits recovery. See id.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 177 (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 406 (1985)). The requirement
is that "the passenger be able to prove that some link in the chain [of causes] was an unusual
or unexpected event external to the passenger." Saks, 470 U.S 392,406 (1985).
168. Roselawn, 954 F. Supp. at 178.
169. E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530,553 (1991).
170. See Roselawn, 954 F. Supp. at 179. For the discussion of Jack and similar cases see
notes 80-126 and accompanying text.
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
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Other lower courts should adopt this principle of treaty
interpretation when they decide similar issues in the future. The
Supreme Court too should follow the express language of the Treaty
and, contrary to the Alvarez decision, avoid writing any ambiguities into
the express terms of Article 17.
III. TREATY INTERPRETATION

In interpreting the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court
consistently placed heavy emphasis on such factors as the negotiating
history, 74 the intent of the drafters,' 75 the subsequent ratification
efforts, 176 and even the case law from other countries-signatories to the
Convention." The justices set a very low level of textual ambiguity.'7
This allowed them to break from the language of the text in order to
find the true meaning of the provision.' 79
The Court repudiated the textualist approach of treaty
interpretation in favor of "its favorite techniques of verbal
deconstruction, followed by structural reconstitution of the text." "0 This
approach created more ambiguities than lower federal courts could
handle.' The position adopted by the Jack court is consistent with the
Supreme Court's methodology, but it is inconsistent with the text of the
Warsaw Convention." The Supreme Court, in interpreting the Warsaw
Convention as a treaty, was always concerned with the result. The Jack
court too was unwilling to permit recovery because the result would
have been inequitable.'8 If the Court was concerned with following the
174. See E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530,542 (1991); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392,401 (1985).
175. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989); El Al Israel Airlines
v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155,170 (1999).
176. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 137 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 273
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. See, e.g., Floyd, 499 U.S. at 551 (1991) (relying on a number of extrinsic factors).
17& See generallyBederman, supranote 46, at 976.
179. See id.

180. Id. at 1025. In his article Professor Bederman argued that the Court cannot expect
a treaty without ambiguity inherently present in it. The Court should adopt a "sensible
threshold of ambiguity, even one self-consciously policy-based or result-oriented, so that
courts could avoid the morass of indeterminacy." Id.
181. See supranotes 80-173 and accompanying text.
182. In Jack, the court adopted a view that damages are permitted for emotional distress
only to the extent the emotional distress is caused by the bodily injury. See Jack v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654,667 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
183. Id. at 668.
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text of Article 17, it would have adopted a position where psychological
damages are recoverable so long as they are accompanied by physical
damages. The text of the treaty is not so ambiguous as to permit the
courts to evaluate extrinsic factors. Article 17 imposes a requirement of
an accident causing the injuries. There is no requirement that physical
injuries proximately cause psychological injuries."
The Supreme Court should adopt the following principles of treaty
interpretation: (1) begin interpretation with the text of the treaty; (2)
adopt a high threshold of ambiguity; (3) consider sources other than text
only when "the words of the text produce a result that is 'manifestly
absurd or unreasonable."'"l Additionally, the Supreme Court should be
mindful of the "liberal expansive interpretation [of a treaty that] has its
origins in the 1890 Supreme Court opinion in Geofroy v. Riggs.""
Let us apply the test proposed above to Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention and see if psychological injuries that are accompanied by
physical injuries, not necessarily caused by them, are recoverable.
Article 17 provides:
M

The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking."

184. See generally Alvarez, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13656, at *1; See also Boulee, supra
note 19, at 501 (arguing that the courts should adopt the same approach that the Jack court
adopted because this approach prevents "serious inequities" among the passengers, and it is
consistent with the intent of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention).
185. Bederman, supra note 46, at 1030 (quoting The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969 art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331). Professor Bederman, in criticizing the
Supreme Court's methodology of treaty interpretation, urged the Court to follow the
textualist approach and to adopt a level of ambiguity set forth in the Vienna Convention. See
id. For example, in Saks, the Court stated that whoever interprets a treaty must consult the
text first. 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985). After acknowledging the overall effectiveness and
desirability of the textualist approach, the Court immediately added that "the context in
which the written words are used" must be considered as well. Id. The invitation to review
the context opened the door for the consideration of extrinsic factors.
186. Bederman, supra note 46, at 966 (citing Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890)).
Professor Bederman quotes from the opinion of Justice Field, "[T]reaties, ... shall be
liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality
and reciprocity between them... [Where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive
of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be
preferred." Id at 966-67 (quoting Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. at 271-72).
187. Official text as ratified by Senate in 1934, supra note 19.
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The text of the treaty provides that in order to recover, a plaintiff
needs to suffer either death, or wounding, or bodily injury that was
caused by the accident. The text of the treaty does not require, unlike
the Alvarez court, that bodily injuries cause the mental injuries. The
Floyd decision interpreted the phrase "bodily injury" and stated that
89
"pure psychic injury" is not part of the phrase."
The unanimous
Supreme Court thus made an interpretation that under the treaty, a
physical injury is a prerequisite for recovery of whatever type. Where a
plaintiff alleges a physical injury, thus satisfying Floyd, and states that
the accident caused a psychological injury, thus satisfying the plain text
of the treaty, the only logical conclusion is to permit recovery for the
psychological injuries.
If the court was to adopt a high threshold of ambiguity, suggested by
Professor Bederman, there would be no need to consult external
sources, such as prior negotiations, French dictionaries, or intent of the
drafters. The interpretation based on the plain meaning of the text is
not "manifestly absurd or unreasonable. " 9
Finally, the fear that "a back door would be impermissibly opened to
recovery for purely psychological injuries"" if the plain-text
interpretation is adopted represents a result-oriented approach. This
approach, although favored by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, is
contrary to the method of liberal expansive interpretation. The
approach advocated by the Alvarez court does not recognize the
principles of reciprocity and equality between the countries-signatories
of the treaty. Rejection of psychological damages restricts the rights of
the passengers and impermissibly shifts the balance of protection in
favor of the airlines. Such a shift is not consistent with the express
language of the treaty, the intent of the drafters, and the gruesome
realities191 of today's commercial aviation industry.
188. E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530,552 (1991).
189. Bederman, supranote 46, at 966 n.55.
190. Alvarez v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 98-Civ.1027, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13656, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1999).
191. Two accidents during the course of international air transportation took place in
January of 2000. On Sunday, January 30, 2000, Kenyan Flight 431 from Abidjan, Kenya to
Lagos, Nigeria crashed just moments after take-off. The plane carried 10 crew members and
169 passengers. Only 10 people survived. It has been reported that an American citizen was
on that plane. It is very much possible that the Warsaw Convention would be implicated in
this matter. See Recovery Mission for Kenyan Jet <http://www.airdisaster.com/>. (visited

Sept. 15, 2000). On Monday, January 31, 2000 Alaskan Airlines Flight 261, en route from
Puerto Vallarta, Mexico to San Francisco, went down in the Pacific Ocean, off southern
California. 88 people died. See id Because this was an international flight, the airline's
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IV. CONCLUSION

In Floyd, the Supreme Court left unanswered the question of
whether a passenger who suffers injuries in the course of international
transportation can recover for psychological injuries that are
accompanied by physical injuries. Lower federal courts have divided on
this issue. Most recently, federal district courts in Alvarez v. American
Airlines and Carey v. United Airlines held that the Warsaw Convention
requires a strong causal connection between physical and psychological
injuries, and in the absence of the link, psychological injuries are not
recoverable, even if accompanied by physical injuries. The holdings in
Alvarez and Carey are inconsistent with the express language of the
Warsaw Convention. This Comment argued that the Supreme Court
must revisit its 1991 Floyd decision. The Supreme Court should
interpret the Warsaw Convention consistent with its express language,
should adopt a high threshold of ambiguity, and should hold that Article
17 permits recovery for psychological injuries that are accompanied by
physical injuries.
MAX CHESTER

liability, if any, would be subject to the limitations of the Warsaw Convention.

